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HIS Article covers cases from 232 S.W.3d through 257 S.W.3d
which the authors believed were noteworthy for adding to the ju-
risprudence on the applicable subject.
I. MORTGAGES, LIENS, AND FORECLOSURES
Mackey v. Great Lakes Investments, Inc.' addresses the interplay be-
tween competing claims under a deed of trust lien, an abstract of judg-
ment, and a direct assignment of rights under an oil and gas lease,
coupled with a bankruptcy plan of reorganization. While the facts are
complex, it is best explained by analyzing the three separate chains of
title. Under the first chain of title, the original property owner, Martinez,
executed a deed of trust to First Federal in January 1989.2 On Febru-
* B.B.A., M.B.A., J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law,
Winstead PC, Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Texas A&M; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Win-
stead PC, Dallas, Texas.
1. 255 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
2. Id. at 246.
1409
SMU LAW REVIEW
ary 11, 1994, Martinez filed bankruptcy. 3 The original First Federal deed
of trust lien, acquired by MCM Investments in June 1995, was recognized
in the bankruptcy plan of reorganization. Pursuant thereto, MCM ob-
tained two notes and deeds of trust. MCM ultimately foreclosed on those
deeds of trust in August 1999, and Great Lakes Investments was the pur-
chaser at the foreclosure sale.4 The property covered by the First Federal
deed of trust included four interests: (1) fee title to a designated tract of
land; (2) a security interest in the Martinez rights to royalty payments
under a pooling unit; (3) a residential tract; and (4) "all leases now ex-
isting or hereafter made" and "all rents and revenues of the Property
including those now due or to become due by virtue of any lease or other
agreement for the occupancy or use of all or any portion of [the] Prop-
erty."'5 However, on the MCM deeds of trust, the property and descrip-
tion included the first three interests, but the fourth interest was
described as "all present and future rent and other income and receipts
from the property."'6
The second chain emanated from a November 1992 oil and gas lease
executed by Martinez to Chevron. The rights to royalty payments made
under the oil and gas lease were assigned from Martinez to Mackey in
May 1999, as payment for services rendered by Mackey, the attorney rep-
resenting Martinez in the bankruptcy proceeding. The debt to Mackey
for such representation was confirmed in the plan of reorganization ap-
proved in March 1997. 7 The third chain related to indebtedness of Marti-
nez to First National Bank of South Texas, for which there was an agreed
judgment in June 1993. First National Bank of South Texas recorded an
abstract of judgment in February 1994, three days after the bankruptcy
filing by Martinez. Ultimately, Madrid and Laredo's Trading Com-
pany, Ltd. acquired the abstract of judgment from First National Bank of
South Texas on August 6, 1999, two days after the MCM foreclosure of its
deeds of trust. Madrid proceeded with execution on its abstract of judg-
ment pursuant to a sheriff's sale which was held in October 1999.8
When Mackey acquired the direct assignment of all the royalty inter-
ests under the Chevron lease, he notified Chevron which began making
payments to him. Chevron stopped making payments after Great Lakes
demanded payments be made directly to it, as the property owner, pursu-
ant to the August 1999 deed of trust foreclosure sale. When Chevron
ceased making payments, this lawsuit was initiated. A summary judg-
ment was granted in favor of Great Lakes against Madrid, declaring that
Great Lakes' interest was superior to Madrid's lien claim because the
Madrid lien claim accrued by reason of an abstract of judgment obtained
three days after the bankruptcy filing in violation of the automatic bank-
3. Id. at 247.
4. Id. at 248.
5. Id. at 246-47.
6. Id. at 247-48.
7. Id. at 247.
8. Id. at 249.
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ruptcy stay.9 The court followed a well-settled rule that when "the owner
of real estate executes a valid deed of trust, and then conveys an interest
in the mortgaged property to a third party, the rights of the mortgagor's
grantee are subject to the rights held by the beneficiary of the deed of
trust."' 0 However, this case is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First,
it underscores the importance of certainty in the description of the mort-
gaged property. Mackey had asserted that the language contained in the
MCM deeds of trust did not cover the assignment of royalty payments
under the Chevron oil and gas lease; however, the court concluded that
the language "all present and future rent and other income and receipts
from the [Chevron lease] property" covered the royalty interest on the
Chevron lease.' Second, this case recognizes the importance of the ef-
fect of the automatic stay in bankruptcy-which, in this case, caused the
filing of an abstract of judgment three days after the automatic stay went
into effect, without bankruptcy court approval lifting the stay as to such
remedial action-to invalidate the lien purported to be created by the
abstract of judgment.
The issue of res judicata in connection with a hearing on a motion to
lift the automatic stay in bankruptcy was presented in Mitchell v. Fort
Davis State Bank.12 The Mitchells owned property, four acres of which
was used as a homestead and four acres of which was used for business
purpose. Financing for the business property was obtained from Fort Da-
vis State Bank. Thereafter, the Mitchells filed for bankruptcy protection,
and the bank ultimately sought relief from the automatic stay to allow for
foreclosure of its lien against the business property. 13 The bankruptcy
court lifted the stay and the bank foreclosed, which was challenged based
upon the validity of the lien.14 The Mitchells contended that the entire
eight acres was homestead property despite a homestead designation and
an affidavit of non-homestead executed in connection with the four acre
business property. The court dismissed such claim determining that the
validity of the lien on the business property was adjudicated in the lift
stay hearing and constituted res judicata. Since the validity of the lien
was an issue raised in bankruptcy court, federal law of res judicata was
deemed to control.' 5 Under either a contested matter or an adversary
proceeding, the validity of the deed of trust lien was a matter that should
have been addressed in the automatic stay proceeding, and therefore, the
mortgagor's claims were precluded by res judicata. In supporting this
conclusion, the court analyzed the requirements for granting relief from
the automatic stay in bankruptcy:' 6 the mortgagee must prove that it
9. Id.
10. Id. at 253.
11. Id.
12. 243 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2007, no pet.).
13. Id. at 121.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 122 (citing Geary v. Tex. Commerce Bank, 967 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tex. 1998)).
16. Id. at 125. Relief from automatic stay is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)-(2).
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holds a claim, the claim is a valid perfected lien upon the subject prop-
erty, and a decline in the value of the collateral is occurring or threatened
against which the creditor is precluded from protecting its interest. 17
Therefore, the court concluded that the bank "was required to make a
prima facie showing that it held a valid and perfected lien."' 18 The Mitch-
ells did not object to the lift stay motion, and the court concluded that
they were not entitled to collaterally attack the validity of the bank's lien
in a subsequent civil proceeding because the challenge to the validity of
the lien could or should have been raised before the bankruptcy court.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes raising such issue in a subsequent
proceeding.1 9
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished the facts from an
existing case relied on by the Mitchells, Pemelton v. Russell Trusts Part-
nership.20 There were three reasons the court distinguished Pemelton.
First, in Pemelton, the creditor's suit for judicial foreclosure was filed dur-
ing the pendency of the bankruptcy, and not after the foreclosure as oc-
curred in the subject case. 21 Second, the court distinguished between a
direct and indirect defense of the debtor, concluding that indirect de-
fenses, such as lender liability, did not need to be raised with respect to a
motion to lift stay, and they would not constitute res judicata.22 Third,
the court concluded that the Pemelton court had subsequently taken a
different position and applied the principles enunciated in D-1 Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank.23
When is a notice of acceleration of the debt not a prerequisite for fore-
closure? The court approved the filing of an expedited application for
foreclosure without any notice of acceleration in Burney v. Citigroup
Global Markets Realty Corp.24 Burney obtained a home equity loan from
Long Beach Mortgage Company. Long Beach assigned the note to
Norwest Bank, and Burney failed to make any monthly payments under
the home equity loan.25 Norwest Bank sent a notice of intent to acceler-
ate letter. The default was not cured, and Norwest Bank filed an applica-
tion for expedited foreclosure proceeding. 26 However, the application
was subsequently dismissed for want of prosecution. The home equity
loan was ultimately transferred to Citigroup, which sent a notice of accel-
eration of the loan and filed a home equity foreclosure application. Bur-
ney filed a lawsuit alleging that the statute of limitations on the debt
17. Id. (citing In re Self, 239 B.R. 877, 881 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) and In re Kowalsky,
235 B.R. 590, 594 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 125-26.
20. Id. at 122-24 (discussing Pemelton v. Russell Trusts P'ship, 913 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.)).
21. Id. at 123.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 123-24 (citing D-1 Enterprises, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank, 864 F.2d 36,
39 (5th Cir. 1989)).
24. 244 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
25. Id. at 901.
26. Id. at 902.
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evidenced by the home equity loan had expired making the attempted
foreclosure invalid.27 The specific issue before the court was whether the
filing by Norwest Bank of the expedited application for foreclosure in
April 2000 constituted an effective notice of acceleration, which would
have started the running of the four year statute of limitations for recov-
ery under a real property lien foreclosure. 28 In what appears to be a case
of first impression, the court considered other relevant cases for gui-
dance. Acceleration occurred by means other than a specific letter advis-
ing the debtor of the acceleration of the debt in Joy Corp. v. Nob Hill
Properties, Ltd.29 Nob Hill missed an installment payment and received a
letter stating the note was in default. Nob Hill attempted to cure the
default, but Joy Corp. refused to inform the debtor of the amount needed
to cure the default and subsequently posted the property for foreclosure
sale. The Joy court held acceleration never occurred because Joy Corp.
did not give the required opportunity to cure the default.30 This court
also reviewed the holding in Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v.
Wolf,3 1 where the lender provided both a notice of intent to accelerate
and notice of acceleration. However, the debtor took the position that
acceleration required taking steps toward foreclosure on the property.
The Wolf court noted the disagreement of the Texas Supreme Court in
requiring affirmative action toward foreclosure as a step, in addition to
notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration, in order to trig-
ger an actual acceleration of the note.32
The court finally looked at cases construing the notice of a trustee sale
as equivalent to a notice of acceleration. In McLemore v. Pacific South-
west Bank, the lender sent a notice of intent to accelerate but not a notice
of acceleration. 33 When the debt remained unpaid, the lender sent a no-
tice of trustee's sale, and the property was sold at the foreclosure sale.
That court held that it could be reasonably inferred that a notice of intent
to accelerate followed by a notice of trustee's sale constitutes a notice of
acceleration. 34 In Meadowbrook Gardens, Ltd. v. WMFMT Real Es-
tate Ltd. Partnership, a notice of intent to accelerate and a subsequent
notice of foreclosure sale was given by the lender. 35 Relying on McLe-
more, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that such action amounted
to a notice of acceleration. 36
27. Id.
28. Id.; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035(a) (Vernon 2002).
29. Burney, 244 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Joy Corp. v. Nob Hill Props., Ltd., 543 S.W.2d
691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ)).
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 569 (Tex.
2001)).
32. Id. at 903-04.
33. Id. at 904 (citing McLemore v. Pac. Sw. Bank, 872 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1994, writ dism'd by agr.)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Meadowbrook Gardens, Ltd. v. WMFMT Real Estate Ltd. P'ship, 980




During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court entered its deci-
sion, per curium, in LaSalle Bank National Ass'n v. White.37 White ob-
tained a home equity loan for the purpose of refinancing an existing
purchase money mortgage and paying some ad valorem taxes, with the
balance being paid directly to White. The loan was secured by homestead
property designated for agricultural use which is in violation of the appli-
cable provisions of the Texas Constitution.38 On appeal, the parties ac-
knowledged the invalidity of the lien for all purposes except for equitable
subrogation with respect to payments of valid prior liens on homestead
property.39 The Texas Supreme Court held that equitable subrogation
was not addressed and was therefore not eliminated under the constitu-
tional provision. 40 The Texas Supreme Court reviewed prior authority
upholding equitable subrogation in the homestead context in reaching its
conclusion. Such authority included equitable subrogation against home-
stead property, even when the refinancing was unconstitutional, where
the loan was used to pay off valid federal tax liens based on the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and where equitable
subrogation was deemed valid to the extent of payment of prior purchase
money liens, although the home equity loan was invalid with respect to
subrogation resulting from judicial sales which included irregularities in
the process sufficient to fail to convey title.41 Consequently, the court
concluded that Texas Constitution, article XVI, section 50(e) does not
abrogate the longstanding common law principle allowing equitable sub-
rogation to constitutionally permitted purchase money and property tax
liens on homestead properties. 42
Perhaps the most significant case during the Survey period-due to the
damage it did to the jurisprudence on foreclosure-is Myrad Properties
vs. LaSalle Bank National Ass'n.43 In Myrad, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals considered the effectiveness of a notice of trustee sale to sell two
separate pieces of property when the notice contained a description of
only one of the two tracts of property. Myrad executed a single note and
single deed of trust which covered two tracts of property, the La Casa
Apartments and the Grande Casa Apartments. 44 After a default on the
note, LaSalle instructed the trustee to commence foreclosure proceed-
ings, and the trustee prepared a notice of default, demand for immediate
cure, and notice of intention to accelerate the indebtedness. 45 The note
was accelerated, and such letter of acceleration correctly referenced both
properties. The notice of substitute trustee's sale (Notice), which is re-
37. 246 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. 2007).
38. Id. at 617-18 (citing TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(I)).
39. Id. at 618.
40. Id. at 618-19.
41. Id. at 619.
42. Id.
43. 252 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. granted).
44. Id. at 608.
45. Id. at 609.
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cited in its entirety in the text of the opinion, 46 contained a legal descrip-
tion of only the Grande Casa parcel, and not the La Casa property. Prior
to foreclosure, Myrad's bankruptcy counsel sent to LaSalle's counsel a
letter stating "[w]ith your foreclosure on the above-referenced real estate
set next Tuesday."'47 At the foreclosure sale, the substitute trustee read
the legal description attached to the Notice which described only the
Grande Casa property. The substitute trustee entered a credit bit for
LaSalle and sold the property to LaSalle. Later the same day, the substi-
tute trustee executed a substitute trustee's deed, which contained a
description of only the Grande Casa property, and it was recorded. After
an initial temporary restraining order obtained by Myrad had lapsed, the
substitute trustee filed a correction deed to add a legal description cover-
ing both properties.48 The court concluded that the Notice was sufficient
to cover both tracts of property by implication. Although the court noted
that the trustee's power to sell the property is derived from the deed of
trust and foreclosure statute, and that strict compliance with these re-
quirements is a prerequisite to the trustee's right to make a sale, the court
concluded that the notice was sufficient based on a number of ratio-
nales, 49 none of which are convincing to this author.
First, the court looked into the mind of the mortgagee and concluded
that its intent was to foreclose on both tracts of property based on testi-
mony from the mortgagor and related parties. Further, the court miscon-
strued the meaning of a provision in the Notice, which provides that the
mortgagee elects to proceed against "both the real property and any per-
sonal property described in the Deed of Trust."50 Myrad correctly pointed
out that this provision should be understood by all knowledgeable practi-
tioners as relating to the election of the right under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Section 9.604, allowing personal property to be sold
together with the real property. 51 However, the majority disagreed with
such rationale and concluded that such language must be deemed to refer
to both tracts of real property. The dissent discussed the interpretation
by the majority and correctly concluded that the language in the Notice
was consistent with a UCC reference to both real property and personal
property, as opposed to a reference to both tracts of real property.52
Next, the court rejected another cogent argument related to a specific
provision in the deed of trust, which allowed the mortgagee to sell the
entire property "or any part thereof ... at one or more sales, as an entity
or in parcels.' 53 The court rationalized its holding by quoting from Mer-
cer v. Bludworth, where the notice of trustee sale identified the deed of
46. Id.
47. Id. at 611.
48. Id. at 611-12.
49. Id. at 615.
50. Id. at 616.
51. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.604 (Vernon 2002)).
52. Id. at 627.
53. Id. at 616.
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trust with an incorrect date and incorrect recording reference, but in-
cluded a correct metes and bounds description of the property to be sold
and name of the trustee.54 The Mercer court held that the error and in-
consistency in describing the deed of trust did not render the sale invalid
since the property to be sold was properly described, and a bidding party
could have contacted the trustee to clear up any confusion.55 The Myrad
court concluded that it was facing the converse and that the inaccurate
metes and bounds description of the properties to be sold were corrected
by a proper reference to the deed of trust recording information, identify-
ing the substitute trustee and providing contact information. 56 This
seems illogical because it conflicts with the strict requirement procedure
previously quoted by the court.57 Note that the court, in addressing an-
other issue on the effects of chilling the biding, acknowledged that the
inconsistent property descriptions were "the sort of irregularity in the
foreclosure process that could potentially have some propensity to con-
fuse or deter potential bidders interested in purchasing both the Grande
Casa and La Casa Apartments. ' '58 The court acknowledged, but appar-
ently dismissed, the holding in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Summers
& Miller Gleneagles Joint Venture,59 which held that a foreclosure based
on erroneously transposed legal descriptions of two tracts resulting in ex-
cess land in one tract and less land in the other tract, was clearly sufficient
to question the irregularity in the foreclosure process.
With respect to a chilling of the bidding irregularity, the court con-
cluded that there were other potential bidders at the foreclosure sale,
none of whom made any bids, and therefore, in the court's mind, there
could be no proof of a grossly inadequate bid price by reason of such
legal description confusion.60 This appears to be a nafve and incorrect
conclusion by the majority. If bidders believed they were bidding on only
one property, it is common sense that the bid price would be less than if
such bidders believed that two properties were being sold. It is inconceiv-
able that the court could come to the conclusion that the property
description confusion would not have chilled the bidding. The dissent
challenged the majority's inconsistency in holding that the Notice could
be "internally inconsistent regarding what property would be sold" in the
face of the statutory requirement of strict compliance as well as the provi-
sions of the deed of trust and the Notice.61 The dissent also called into
question the majority's reliance on the concept that both mortgagor and
mortgagee knew which properties were intended to be foreclosed and
54. Id. at 617 (citing Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 615.
58. Id. at 618.
59. Id. (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Summers & Miller Gleneagles Joint Venture,
791 F. Supp. 653, 654-55 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (applying Texas law)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 625.
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pointed out that the Notice also ran in favor of the public, and that any
understanding between mortgagor and mortgagee would not have any
bearing on the public's reading of the actual Notice. 6 2 The dissent suc-
cinctly states the problem with the majority opinion: "The majority's in-
terpretation renders the Property description actually contained in the
Notice meaningless. '63 From a practitioner's viewpoint, we can only hope
that subsequent courts will see the error in logic and refuse to follow any
of the holdings contained in the majority's opinion relating to the suffi-
ciency of the legal description.
II. DEBTOR/CREDITOR; NOTES AND LOANS
In Fix v. Flagstar Bank, FSB64 the court addressed the retroactivity of
the provisions of Texas Constitution article XVI, section 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)
and, more importantly, the length of the constitutionally mandated cure
period for a home equity loan. Mr. and Mrs. Fix obtained a home equity
loan in March 2002 and refinanced that loan with a conventional loan in
January 2003. 65 Since the refinancing occurred less than one year after
the home equity loan was obtained, it was in violation of the Texas Con-
stitution.66 Under the current version of the constitution, the lender has
sixty days to cure the violation after being notified by the borrower. 67 At
the time of the refinancing, the constitution required cure within a "rea-
sonable time."'68 Therefore, the court had to determine if this amend-
ment applied retroactively. The court considered prior cases dealing with
retroactivity of constitutional amendments. Although the Texas Supreme
Court had found retroactivity in the case of a constitutional amendment
relating to premarital agreements, 69 the court noted that the Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Texas specifically refused retroactive
application of the amendment. 70 The court found that retroactive appli-
cation occurs when the drafters and adopters of the constitutional amend-
ments intended such retroactivity 71 and where public policy is so clear
and broadly stated as to make retroactivity unmistakable. 72 First, the
court looked at the literal language of the amendment, which did not in-
dicate any intention for retroactive application.73 Next, the court looked
at the legislative history and found that the drafters intended the subject
amendment as a mere clarification of the cure process. 74 After finding
62. Id. at 627.
63. Id. at 628.
64. 242 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
65. Id. at 152.
66. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(M)(iii)).
67. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x).
68. Id. (amended 2003).
69. Id.
70. Fix, 242 S.W.3d at 156 (discussing Adams v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 307 B.R.
549, 559 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004)).
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that there was no overriding social policy in favor of its retroactive appli-
cation, the court concluded that retroactive application was unwarranted
in this constitutional amendment. 75
The court also considered the issue of the lender's attempted cure. Af-
ter the refinancing occurred, the borrower contacted the lender and dis-
cussed the legality of the refinancing loan in a phone conversation.76 The
lender responded the next day with a letter confirming the conversation
and advising the borrower that the title company had been notified of the
conversation.77 The title company also responded to the Fixes with a let-
ter, which denied the validity of the loan. In response to the title com-
pany's letter, Mr. Fix sent a letter detailing the two constitutional grounds
for dispute of the second loan.78 Within twenty-one days after receiving
such letter, the lender offered to cure the home equity loan violation by
refinancing at an equal or better rate at no cost to the borrower and the
payment to the borrower of $1,000; a concurrent letter from the title com-
pany offered to reclose the loan for free. The Fixes refused such cure and
demanded forfeiture of the entire amount of principal and interest on
such refinanced loan pursuant to Texas Constitution article XVI, sec-
tion 50(a)(6)(Q)(x). 7 9 The applicable version of this statute contained no
specific cure period.80 The Texas Supreme Court answered certified
questions from the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Doody
v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., regarding a home equity loan, and con-
cluded that the subject constitutional provision allowed the lender a rea-
sonable opportunity to cure not only the particular defect of issue but
also to validate the entire lien.81 The Fix court concluded that the three
month period of discussions between the bank, the title company, and the
Fixes occurred within the time period approved by the Texas Supreme
Court in Doody, and the cure was within a reasonable period of time, as
required by the constitution. 82
III. GUARANTIES/INDEMNITIES
Ayres Welding Co. v. Conoco, Inc.83 involves a contractual indemnity
dispute and illustrates the need for careful draftsmanship in preparing
indemnity provisions. The indemnity in question arises from a welding
75. Id. at 156-57.
76. Id. at 152.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 153.
80. Id. at 154-55. Such constitutional provision read, in applicable part, as follows:
"the lender ... shall forfeit all principal and interest of the.., credit if the lender.., fails
to comply with the lender's.., obligations under the extension of credit within a reasona-
ble time after the lender ... is notified ... of the lender's failure to comply." TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x).
81. Fix, 242 S.W.3d at 157 (citing Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 49 S.W.3d 342
(Tex. 2002)).
82. Id. at 158.
83. 243 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
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and maintenance contract between Ayres, the contractor, and Conoco.
The contract contained a number of separate contractual provisions deal-
ing with indemnity obligations.8 4 The injury in question occurred to Day,
an Ayres employee injured in an automobile driven by a Conoco em-
ployee after hours and off the job site. Ayres's first argument was that
the automobile accident was not incidental to the work and should not be
the subject of the indemnification.8 5 The court pointed to the provisions
in the employee injury indemnification paragraph that plainly stated it
applied "[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Contract," and
therefore, the question of whether the accident occurred in connection
with the subject work was not relevant.8 6 Further, because the liability
limitation provision was contained in a paragraph separate from the em-
ployee injury indemnification provision, the $1,000,000 limitation did not
protect Ayres from Conoco's $1,700,000 claim for the damages awarded
to Day.87
This case is illustrative for purposes of drafting indemnification provi-
sions. The primary focus of all these indemnification provisions may have
been intended to relate only to the "work" as defined in the contract;
however, it was not clearly expressed in the contractual provisions.
Therefore, care should be taken in drafting complex indemnification pro-
visions to be specific as to the subject matter of each indemnification.
Furthermore, use of the standard drafting term "notwithstanding any-
thing to the contrary" should be carefully considered in the context of
each separate provision.
The drafting of indemnity provisions is also addressed in MEMC Elec-
tronic Materials v. Albemarle Corp.88 This dispute involved an asset
purchase agreement whereby Albemarle sold a manufacturing plant to
MEMC. 89 The agreement contained a number of assumption provisions
listing the various contracts assumed. However, a preexisting indemnity
contract between Ethyl and Albemarle (dealing with indemnification of
injuries to employees on the work site) was not disclosed in the asset
purchase agreement. The asset purchase agreement did contain a sepa-
rate indemnity provision which was broadly worded whereby MEMC
agreed to indemnify Albemarle from all damages arising from the opera-
tion of the plant after the closing date. 90 In construing this separate in-
demnity provision, the court concluded that the indemnification
84. Id. at 180. Section 14.1 of the contract was an overriding application of the indem-
nity provisions (beginning with "except as otherwise provided in this contract") and speci-
fying that the indemnity would apply regardless of the negligence of the indemnified party.
A separate paragraph provided that Ayres indemnified Conoco for personal injuries aris-
ing from the specified work, with a $1,000,000 per occurrence limitation. A third para-
graph provided Ayres indemnified Conoco for any losses relating to injuries to Ayres'
employees, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the contract.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 179, 181-83.
88. 241 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
89. Id. at 69.
90. Id. at 70.
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provisions of the asset purchase agreement did not arise from the opera-
tions of the plant, but arose out of a prior contractual relationship.91 This
again shows the need for careful drafting with respect to indemnity
provisions.
IV. USURY
In Allen v. American General Finance, Inc.,92 the court addressed
whether a usury charge could occur in a letter never received. The home
equity lender sent a demand letter to Allen which contained a charge in
excess of the 18% statutory limit. The property which was the subject of
the home equity loan was located on Nashville Drive in San Antonio, and
it was deeded to Allen and his father. The deed listed Allen's mailing
address at a Cypress Garden Drive in San Antonio, although Allen actu-
ally lived in Oregon.93 Allen's father lived at the Cypress Garden Drive
address, and one of Allen's brothers lived at the Nashville Drive address.
American General defended against the usury claim brought by Allen by
arguing that interest was never charged on the home equity loan since
Allen did not receive the demand letter. 94 American General relied upon
two cases, George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Service, Inc.95 and Hoxie Imple-
ment Co. v. Baker,96 which the San Antonio Court of Appeals distin-
guished. In Fuller, the court was construing a charge for interest
contained in pleadings and determined that it was not a charge for pur-
poses of the usury statutes since it was not communicated to the debtor.97
Similarly, in Hoxie, the usury claim was based on the charging of interest
on an internal computer system on an account receivable, but the debtor
had never been sent an invoice which included such charge.98 The Hoxie
court concluded there was no charge because there was no express and
positive demand for usurious interest. 99 The court determined that
neither of these cases expressly addressed the issue of whether a debtor
actually received and read a charge and that, therefore, they could not
support that proposition. Rather, the holdings were limited to circum-
stances where the usury charge was not communicated outside the organ-
ization making the charge. Consequently, the court concluded that for
purposes of the usury statute, a demand for usurious interest contained in
a letter addressed and sent to the debtor was a charge within the meaning
of the statute without requiring proof that the intended recipient actually
received and read the letter.1°°
91. Id. at 75.
92. 251 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. granted).
93. Id. at 682.
94. Id. at 689.
95. Id. (citing George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Serv., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992)).
96. Id. (citing Hoxie Implement Co. v. Baker, 65 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2001, pet. denied)).
97. Id.






When can a title company affect the validity of a contract? In Petras v.
Criswell, the contract contained an opening paragraph reciting that the
contract would not be effective until the title company also signed the
contract acknowledging receipt of the earnest money.1 01 The purchaser
failed to submit summary judgment evidence showing that the title com-
pany signed the contract, and the court concluded that the purchaser
could not successfully maintain a breach of contract claim because it did
not show the existence of a valid contract.'0 2 While otherwise unremark-
able, this case represents a lesson for practitioners in drafting provisions
requiring the title company to sign as a condition precedent to the effec-
tiveness of the contract of sale.
Hawkins v. Walker'0 3 is one of numerous cases during the Survey pe-
riod dealing with fraud in connection with a purchase and sale agreement.
The Walkers bought a lot from Rischon Development Corp., of which
Hawkins is the president.'0 4 The sales brochures for the subdivision de-
picted a high-end subdivision, and the Walkers built a 5,000 square foot
house initially valued at $896,000 (but later reduced by change orders
during construction to a value of $732,000). The subdivision contained
restrictive covenants applicable to the high-end subdivision contem-
plated. However, after purchase of the lots, the covenants were revoked
by Rischon. 10 5 During the lot purchase negotiations, Hawkins made nu-
merous presentations to the Walkers concerning the quality of the subdi-
vision, which were relied upon by the Walkers. However, after
construction of Walkers' house commenced, and the remainder of the lots
were sold by Rischon to Pulte Homes, reflecting a lower quality subdivi-
sion, the Walkers reduced the quality of their home. Some of the cost
savings were made pursuant to oral agreements with Hawkins allowing
the deviation from the covenants; however, many of the deviations in the
covenants were not approved or discussed with Hawkins.' 0 6
On appeal, Hawkins took issue with damages awarded to the Walkers
pursuant to the Texas Property Code. 10 7 Hawkins contends that there
was neither a homeowners' association nor a representative designated
by an owner of real property. In reviewing the statute and its legislative
intent, the court concluded that the legislative intent evidenced that only
the property owners association or the designated representative of a
property owner may sue for damages under the statute. 10 8 The court
101. 248 S.W.3d 471, 474 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
102. Id. at 477.
103. 233 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
104. Id. at 386.
105. Id. at 387.
106. Id. at 386-87.
107. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.004(b) (Vernon 2007). In relevant part, this statute
dealing with enforcement of restrictive covenants provides that enforcement of such cove-
nants is available to a "property owners' association or other representative designed by an
owner of real property."
108. 233 S.W.3d at 389.
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noted that the statute does not specify individual property owners as hav-
ing authority to bring suit under the statute. The court reasoned that the
Walkers were obviously not a property owner association and that they
were not "designated representatives of the property owners."'1 9 The
court interpreted the representative requirement as being one requiring
designation by either all or multiple property owners, since it uses the
plural term "property owners."' 110 In support of this interpretation, the
court cited Anderson v. New Property Owners Ass'n. of Newport,'11
which holds that an association designated by a single subdivision owner
as that owner's representative could sue under such statute. Note that in
this case, there was only a single owner, but the court ignores this fact.
The court further cites Musgrave v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners
Ass'n.1 2 as support, which held that a voluntary homeowners association,
open to any property owner, could be appointed as the designated repre-
sentative of such property owners. This author does not believe that any
of the cited cases stand for the proposition that a single owner could not
designate a representative to bring suit. However, relying on such au-
thority, the court held, contrary to the rulings in the authorities it cited,
that a single property owner is not authorized to bring suit under this
statute. This court further failed to address both the exact statutory lan-
guage that allowed suit by a representative designated by "an owner of
real property" and why the legislature used the singular term "owner" if
it intended to require something more.
VI. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
The court addressed the difference between a mailed and a received
notice in Meadows v. Midland Super Block Joint Venture.113 In this case,
the tenant, Midland Super Block Joint Venture, had a lease with Mead-
ows which contained a renewal option exercisable "only by Lessee's de-
livery to Lessor in person or by United States Mail on or before the first
(1st) day of each month." 1 4 The lease provision further provided that
receipt of the check for the $1,000 rent payment would be sufficient no-
tice of the renewal option election. Evidence at trial reflected that Mid-
land's employee deposited the monthly rental check into the United
States Mail on September 30, 2005, it was postmarked October 3, 2005
and was not received by Meadows until October 5, 2005. The issue was
whether the language of the lease required the notice to be sent or re-
ceived by the specified date, with the conclusion that the plain language
of the lease provision required the receipt of the notice on or before the
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 122 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).
112. 990 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
113. 255 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, no pet.) (quoting S. Disposal, Inc. v.
City of Blossom, 165 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.)).
114. Id. at 741.
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first day of the month.' 15 The court looked at other cases and found sup-
port in Southern Disposal, Inc. v. City of Blossom,116 a case where the
contract language clearly intended the notices to be effective when prop-
erly mailed. The court adopted language from the Southern Disposal
court interpreting Brown v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.,117 which noted that
"'when a contract requires only that one party "notify" the other, and the
matter is not defined in the contract, notice occurs at the time a notice is
mailed,"' and held the lease language required the tenant to have deliv-
ered, and not merely mailed, the notice to renew before the specified
date. 118 In light of this case, best drafting practices will focus on using
more descriptive terminology-don't use "delivery" if the date of mailing
is the critical date.
Motiva Enterprises, LLC v. McCrabbt1 9 involves an analysis of a lease
provision dealing with condemnation and the definition of "special dam-
ages" and "leasehold advantage." Motiva had a lease from McCrabb and
operated a gas station and convenience store. The lease provided that the
lease would terminate upon condemnation, but it reserved to the tenant
the right to such condemnation proceeds for amounts relating to "special
damages." Upon condemnation of a portion of the tract, Motiva deter-
mined that the remaining property was unsuitable for its use and chose to
terminate the lease, but claimed it was entitled to the $1,705,000 condem-
nation award as special damages for its "leasehold advantage" under the
condemnation provision. 120 The court looked at the term "special dam-
ages" and concluded that it was a term of art used in condemnation pro-
ceedings, distinguishing it from damages which were "community" in
nature. In other words, community damages are those where the injury
or benefit is one that the property owner experiences in common with the
general community.' 21 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the reten-
tion of special damages to the tenant in a condemnation proceeding was a
non-compensable interest where the lease terminated upon such condem-
nation, thereby preventing a tenant from recovering for loss of future
"leasehold advantage" after the lease is terminated. 122
7979 Airport Garage v. Dollar Rent A Car involves the lease of a park-
ing garage.' 2 3 The lease was between 7979 Airport Garage (7979), as
landlord, and Dollar Rent A Car, as tenant, and contained provisions
dealing with the various repair obligations of each party.1 24 The relevant
115. Id. at 743.
116. S. Disposal, 165 S.W.3d 887.
117. 787 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1990, writ denied).
118. 255 S.W.3d at 744.
119. 248 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
120. Id. at 213. Footnote 1 defines "leasehold advantage" as being the difference be-
tween the lease rate required under the lease and the market value of the lease. Id. at 213
n.1.
121. Id. at 216.
122. Id.
123. 245 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
124. Id. at 493-94 (quoting the entire applicable lease provision).
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provision required that "Lessor shall keep the foundation, the exterior
walls... and roof... in good repair.' 125 Issues arose when the expansion
joints in the garage deteriorated. The landlord's predecessor made tem-
porary repair to the expansion joints in 1999 and 2000. However, a struc-
tural repair report dated December 2000, reflected significant
deterioration of the expansion joints and concluded that repairs were
warranted within one year. Since the deteriorated expansion joints were
on the second and third floor of the garage, the landlord alleged that the
lease provisions made the tenant responsible for the repairs since the ex-
pansion joints did not relate to foundation, exterior walls, or roof. The
court concluded that a reading of the lease as a whole would not support
the landlord's position, noting that an interpretation ignoring the second
and third floor construction was not a consistent interpretation. 126 The
court further noted that the insurance requirements in the lease required
the landlord to insure the full replacement value of the garage, which was
also inconsistent with the landlord's interpretation. 127
Interestingly, at the time 7979 took control of the property, the tenant
executed an estoppel certificate in favor of the predecessor owner, Park-
ing Company of America.' 28 The exact language of the estoppel certifi-
cate indicated that there were no "uncured defaults" on the date of the
estoppel, which was not a false representation because the landlord at the
time had not yet failed to make repairs that were requested or required
pursuant to the terms of the lease. Practitioners should be wary of gen-
eral terms such as "uncured default" which, according to the terms of the
lease instrument, requires specific notice and cure provisions. Addition-
ally, estoppel certificates should be addressed directly to the purchaser or
party intended to rely upon the certificate.
In Landry's Seafood House-Addison v. Snadon, the court addressed
damages for the breach by the tenant, Landry's Seafood House, under a
lease with Snadon. 129 As a preliminary matter, the court first had to ad-
dress issues raised by Landry's with respect to the proper party to recover
under the lease. This arose because the original lease was with Daryl
Snadon, who had assigned his interest under the lease to Lee Snadon.
Subsequently, an assignment and assumption agreement was executed by
Lee Snadon and Landry's, as the successor lessee. The subject property
was later deeded from Lee Snadon to Daryl Snadon as trustee of a man-
agement trust, and then from the trust to Daryl Snadon himself. Landry's
contended that the plaintiff, Daryl Snadon, had no interest under the
lease based on the fact that the lease was subject to an assignment and
125. Id.
126. Id. at 501.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 504 n.21. The court notes, in footnote 21, that the estoppel certificate was
addressed to Property Company of America and not 7979 Airport Garage, implying that
the estoppel might not be actionable since it was not addressed to 7979 Airport Garage.
Id.
129. 233 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
1424 [Vol. 62
Real Property
assumption executed by Lee Snadon, and the subsequent conveyance of
the property contained no express assignment of the lease. 130 In review-
ing this argument, the court found that Landry's did not raise the issue in
a verified denial, which constituted a waiver of such right. 3 1 In support,
the court noted that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93(2) requires a veri-
fied denial to be filed with the court upon an assertion that the subject
party is not the proper party, failing which, the matter will be deemed
admitted.132 Therefore, it would be prudent to include assignment and
assumptions of leases each time the underlying property is conveyed from
grantor to grantee to avoid any possible controversy over to whom the
lease payments are due.
Meridien Hotels v. LHO Financial Partnership I is an interesting case
dealing with a hotel lease and an interpretation of the transfer provisions,
default provisions, and default interest provisions. LaSalle entered into a
lease with MHI Lease Co. Dallas, Inc. (Leaseco), a subsidiary of Mer-
idien, which operated the hotel.133 Ultimately, Meridien decided to sell
substantially its entire hotel management businesses, including Leaseco,
and gave notice to LaSalle, as required by the lease. LaSalle notified
Meridien of LaSalle's intent to purchase Leaseco pursuant to the lease
terms, and specified a closing date within the applicable period. Leaseco
commenced arbitration proceedings to determine its fair market value,
while Meridien instituted suit to defer closing until the fair market value
determination was made. Further, Meridien sent a concurrent letter to
LaSalle noting that Meridien would not participate in the closing. Imme-
diately thereafter, LaSalle provided Leaseco a notice of default and ter-
mination of the lease based on its failure to cooperate in the closing and
orderly transition of the hotel management from Leaseco to LaSalle's
new tenant, Starwood Hotels. After years of pretrial maneuvering, the
court rendered summary judgment and a jury verdict generally in favor of
LaSalle. Upon appeal, Meridien and Leaseco attacked the summary
judgment in favor of LaSalle concerning the breach of the lease and ter-
mination thereof. The court was forced to construe the meaning of the
transfer and termination provisions of the lease.134 In general, the trans-
fer provision gave LaSalle, as the property owner, the right to acquire
Leaseco in the event Meridien decided to sell all of its hotel management
business. LaSalle had an option to elect to purchase for a fair market
value to be agreed upon by the parties or, failing that, by arbitration. The
termination provision allowed the landlord to terminate the lease upon
the occurrence of a change of control in tenant other than as provided in
the transfer provision. Meridien's argument was that until a purchase
price had been established, there could not be a sale to LaSalle, and the
transfer provisions were still effective. The court rejected such interpre-
130. Id. at 433.
131. Id. at 434.
132. TEX. R. Cv. P. 93(2).
133. 255 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
134. These provision are quoted in full in the opinion. See id. at 816.
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tation, construing the transfer provisions as having two requirements:
first, the transfer must be part of a sale of Meridien's hotel management
business; and second, the transfer had to be made upon the terms and
conditions set forth in all subparagraphs of the transfer provisions. 135
Since the subconditions to a permitted transfer had not occurred, the
transfer was not a qualifying "permitted transfer" under such lease provi-
sions. Therefore, the change of control in tenant was not accomplished in
accordance therewith, and LaSalle was authorized to terminate the lease
under the termination provision. 136
The trial court judgment awarded LaSalle disgorgement from Meridien
of all management fees paid to Meridien by Leaseco between the termi-
nation of the lease and Leaseco's vacation of the premises. Meridien al-
leged that disgorgement of management fees was an inappropriate
measure of damages for trespass, and the court agreed. The court re-
viewed several cases applying damages for trespass, including damages
for cost of restoration and repair, loss of use of the land, and loss of ex-
pected profits from use of the land.1 37 However, Leaseco continued to
pay LaSalle the rent that was due under the lease during the period of
trespass. The trial court rendered judgment against Leaseco for the extra
"holdover rent," being fifty percent greater than the minimum (or base)
rent. The court held that "the measure of damages in a trespass case is
the sum necessary to make the victim whole, no more, no less";1 38 there-
fore, the management fees paid were not the proper measure of damage
for a trespass.
Another related issue was prejudgment interest on holdover rent. In
analyzing this issue, the court addressed two other lease provisions, the
default interest rate provision and the holdover rent provision. The de-
fault interest rate provision generally provided that a default rate was due
on all minimum rent, participating rent, or additional charges not finally
paid.1 39 The holdover rent provision of the lease provided that if the ten-
ant holds over after termination, then the lease shall be a tenancy at suf-
ferance with a rental rate of one and one-half times the "[r]ent and other
charges." 140 Meridien argued that the holdover rental provision was pu-
nitive damages, which should not be subject to prejudgment interest. Al-
though agreeing with the legal proposition, the court concluded that the
holdover rent payment was not punitive damages, noting that the lease
did not recite that holdover rent was a penalty, and distinguished Mer-
idien's authorities, which dealt with prejudgment interest in a usury case
and whether an insurance company failed to timely pay a claim. 141 Fur-
135. Id. at 817.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 821.
138. Id.
139. The full provision of the default rate provision, Section 3.2 of the lease, is quoted
in full in the opinion. See id. at 822.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 822-23.
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ther, the court analyzed whether there was any rent unpaid which was
subject to the default interest rate provisions. During the term of the
holdover, the tenant continued to pay rent at the minimum rent rate, but
did not pay the additional fifty percent of rent under the holdover provi-
sion. Upon review, the court noted the default interest provision covered
only minimum rent, participating rent, and additional charges, none of
which included the holdover rents. Therefore, the court concluded that
the default interest under the lease did not cover Leaseco's failure to pay
the fifty percent premium on holdover rent.142 Practitioner should take
note of this holding and be careful in drafting default interest and holdo-
ver provisions if it is intended that the default interest would apply to the
amount of holdover rent.
With respect to prejudgment interest, the court concluded that sec-
tion 304.002 of the Texas Finance Code143 was not applicable since it ap-
plied only where the contract provided for interest; here, the lease did not
provide for interest on the holdover rent.144 Further, the court rejected
LaSalle's assertion for prejudgment interest under Texas Finance Code
section 304.101,145 which applied only to wrongful death, personal injury,
or property damage, determining that property damage relates only to
claims for damages to tangible property, not economic loss or loss of eco-
nomic opportunity. 146 LaSalle also asserted prejudgment interest under
the Finance Code section 302.202 ;147 however, the court rejected this ar-
gument because such section does not apply to prejudgment interest. 148
Finally, the court agreed with LaSalle's position that it was entitled to
prejudgment interest under common law.1 49 The court concluded that
Finance Code section 304.003150 is the appropriate prejudgment interest
statute pursuant to which LaSalle would be entitled to prejudgment
interest.15 1
VII. TITLE MATFERS
A. ADVERSE POSSESSION/TITLE DISPUTES
While there were not any substantive legal developments in the area of
adverse possession during the Survey period, the courts continued to ex-
press disfavor with the use of fences to establish adverse possession. In
Moore v. Stone, the court reversed a finding of adverse possession, indi-
cating that an adverse possession claimant that relies upon grazing as evi-
dence of adverse use and enjoyment must show that the land in dispute
142. Id. at 823.
143. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN., § 304.002 (Vernon 2006).
144. Meridien Hotels, 255 S.W.3d at 823.
145. § 304.101.
146. 255 S.W.3d at 824.
147. § 302.002.
148. 255 S.W.3d at 824.
149. Id.
150. § 304.003(a).
151. 255 S.W.3d at 825.
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was "designedly enclosed. 1 52 Casual or incidental enclosures and occa-
sional grazing did not amount to adverse and hostile possession.1 53 The
court suggested that evidence was required showing not only the erection
and maintenance of the fence by the claimant, but the purpose for which
it was erected. 154 Moreover, sporadic cultivation did not constitute ad-
verse possession. 155 Also of note, the court of appeals gave little
credence to acquiescence, requiring affirmative proof of an initial uncer-
tainty or dispute over the boundary line and an acquiescence or recogni-
tion of the line as the boundary. 156 A mistaken belief would not support
a finding of acquiescence when there was clear proof as to the true loca-
tion of the boundary line.157
The El Paso Court of Appeals similarly expressed disfavor towards cas-
ual fences in Martin v. McDonnold and logically found that a tenant
could not adversely possess against a landlord in the absence of a repudi-
ation of the relationship and an assertion of an adverse claim, together
with notice of the repudiation given to the landlord/owner. 158 As is fairly
established law, joint or common possession between parties precludes an
adverse possession claim because of the lack of exclusiveness.
In yet another survey case, Silver Oil & Gas, Inc. v. EOG Resources,
Inc., the San Antonio Court of Appeals reminded us that in spite of the
many rules for interpreting surveys, the ultimate question is one of the
original survey.1 59 This case provides a good discussion of survey rules,
noting the importance of artificial objects and monuments. When those
monuments could be located, a junior survey could not be used to create
ambiguity or to change the boundary lines of the senior survey. Rather, it
is the purpose of a junior survey to be used as evidence of the location of
the lines of the senior survey. Also important to this case, a call for ad-
joinder has the dignity of a call for an artificial object.
In the context of an easement case, the Texas Supreme Court provided
guidance in connection with the statute of limitations for a statutory fraud
claim. First, the court noted the distinction between a void and a voida-
ble document, pointing out that deeds obtained by fraud are voidable
rather than void.160 Such deeds remain effective until set aside. 161 Thus,
claims to quiet title or other actions to set aside a conveyance for statu-
tory fraud, would be subject to a statute of limitations.162 The limitations
period was triggered by the recordation of instruments in a grantee's
chain of title. Had the contested conveyance been void, it would have
152. 255 S.W.3d 284 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. denied).
153. Id. at 288.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 291-92.
157. Id.
158. 247 S.W.3d 224, 236 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.).
159. 246 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).





resulted in a different treatment because the suit to quiet title would have
simply been addressing a declaration that the conveyance was void. On
the other hand, as noted, a conveyance that is voidable is subject to the
running of limitations. 163
A number of cases dealt with procedural issues in the context of title
disputes. First, Snow v. Donaldson was a partition case with a good, de-
tailed explanation of the partition process, noting the existence of two
appealable orders.164 The two appealable orders include the determina-
tion of the title interests and the partition based upon the commissioner's
report. 165 In this case, the duty to follow proper appellate procedures fell
upon a successor in interest.166
In Taylor v. Hill, the court discussed the virtual representation doctrine
by which an unnamed party may become bound by a judgment based
upon privity of estate, title, or interest appearing in the record. 167 Such a
party was entitled to undertake an appeal from a trial court judgment-in
this case, an heir of the property owners. On the other hand, in Longoria
v. Exxon Mobile Corp., a declaratory judgment action required actual
joinder of all royalty interest holders for determination of the various title
interests.' 68
In one of the most significant cases in this category during the Survey
period, the Dallas Court of Appeals ran past years of precedent in deal-
ing with equitable subrogation and threw the question into the fact ques-
tion mix. In Murray v. Cadle Co.,169 the Dallas Court of Appeals eroded
decades of equitable subrogation law by proclaiming that the ability to
equitably subrogate in a situation where a prior lien was paid off is a
question of fact to be examined under the circumstances of the transac-
tion.' 70 Moreover, in order to get there, the court suggested that a title
company agent might be a purchaser's agent, such that the title com-
pany's knowledge of a judgment lien could be imputed to the purchas-
ers.' 71 Again, this was a decision clearly contrary to established law in
the context of the fiduciary duties and escrow duties of title companies.
Thus, even though a judgment creditor's position was unchanged by rea-
son of the equitable subrogation, the court found that negligence on the
part of one claiming a right to equitable subrogation might be relevant in
balancing the equities and the right to equitable subrogation. In other
words, if the party claiming equitable subrogation had notice of the inter-
vening lien, this would be relevant to the question of equitable subroga-
tion. This conflicts with longstanding Texas precedent permitting
163. Id.
164. 242 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, no pet.).
165. Id. at 572.
166. Id. at 572-73.
167. 249 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied).
168. 255 S.W.3d 174, 180-83 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
169. 257 S.W.3d 291, 300 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
170. Id. at 300-02.
171. Id. at 300.
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equitable subrogation to the extent of the payoff regardless of knowledge
of the intervening lien. While the case is complicated by difficult facts,
some apparent lack of proof and the lack of the purchase money lender
as a party, it does suggest inroads on the theory of equitable subroga-
tion-inroads unjustified by Texas precedent.
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
While Ford172 noted that a claim based on statutory fraud attacks a
conveyance as voidable, the San Antonio Court of Appeals in Dwairy v.
Lopez173 reaffirmed that a forged deed is void ab initio. In this case, the
notary testified that she did not notarize the deed and, together with the
grantor's testimony that he did not sign the deed, the court found the
deed to be forged and therefore void. 174
There were also a number of cases dealing with deed interpretations.
The Texarkana Court of Appeals in Corine, Inc. v. Harris noted the
court's duty to determine whether or not a deed was ambiguous before
permitting a fact question and testimony outside the deed. 7 5 The court
noted that an ambiguity does not arise simply because the parties ad-
vance conflicting interpretations if the court could determine within rea-
son that there was no ambiguity in a deed. 176 In this case, a mineral
reservation of "one-half of the usual one-eighth royalty in all oil, gas,
casing head gas and gasoline," was not susceptible to more than one rea-
sonable interpretation.177 In another deed construction case, Cavazos v.
Cavazos, the San Antonio Court of Appeals used a liberal construction to
uphold a conveyance, allowing parol evidence to explain descriptive
words and identify the land.17 8 In what was really a statute of frauds case,
the court upheld the deed purporting to convey "all that certain interest
in the estate . . . that she is now in possession of."'179 Also of interest in
this case, a quitclaim was sufficient to transfer a future interest in prop-
erty, albeit a future interest which existed at the time of the quitclaim. In
a similar case, Fears v. Texas Bank, the court opined that language such as
"my property," "my land," or "owned by me" was sufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds, if extrinsic evidence showed that the party signing the
memorandum of contract owned a single tract, and only one tract of land
fit the description in the memorandum.' 80 However, the description of
land "off of the west end" was inadequate to describe the shape. 18 1
172. Ford v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 235 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2007).
173. 243 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
174. Id. at 712-13.
175. 252 S.W.3d 657, 659-60 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.).
176. Id. at 660.
177. Id. at 659-60.
178. 246 S.W.3d 175, 180 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
179. Id. at 177.




The Houston Court of Appeals in Chappell Hill Bank v. Smith ex-
tended the theory of estoppel by deed in a case involving a quitclaim to a
first lot and interpretation of a second deed to an adjacent second lot. 182
In the quitclaim deed, the lot owner had quitclaimed an interest in an
easement behind a first lot. Subsequently, the same person acquired an
adjacent second lot which included the easement by reference. The court
interpreted the second deed to include the easement only as adjacent to
the second property and held the claimant estopped by its earlier quit-
claim from claiming an easement behind the first lot.' 83
Finally, Brinston v. Koppers Indus., Inc. points out that a warranty deed
does not convey a right to sue. 184 While a grantor had a cause of action
for damaged property, that cause of action was not conveyed pursuant to
a warranty deed to the plaintiff grantee. In another miscellaneous case,
Irannezhad v. Aldine ISD, the court's ruling provides a warning to those
buying properties at a tax sale. 185 In this case, a third-party purchaser at
the tax sale was subject to a subsequent suit brought by the taxing author-
ity against the purchaser for taxes which arose post-judgment. This was
so even though the sale occurred at a time not only obviously after the
judgment, but also after the time the subsequent tax liability as to the
property had arisen.
C. EASEMENTS
Estoppel was also extended into the easement area pursuant to the
easement-by-estoppel doctrine, which has seen a recent resurgence in the
reported cases. In Mitchell v. Garza, an adjacent property owner alleged
an easement by estoppel to use his neighbor's driveway. 186 To establish
the existence of an easement by estoppel, the promisee has the burden of
proving the typical elements of estoppel, including that a representation
was made which was intended to be relied upon and which was relied
upon by the recipient. While the court noted that acquiescence or a fail-
ure to object could give rise to a representation, in this case, the occa-
sional use of the driveway was insufficient. l8 7 Moreover, and most
importantly, in this area of the law, no easement of estoppel will be im-
posed against a subsequent purchaser for value who has no notice, actual
or constructive, of the claimed easement.' 88
The extent of an easement also received a good analysis in South Tex.
66 Pipeline Co. v. Spoor.189 In this case, while a pipeline easement was
assignable, the burden imposed upon the land by the pipeline easement
could not be increased beyond what was contemplated in the original
182. 257 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
183. Id. at 329.
184. 538 F. Supp. 2d 969 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
185. 257 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
186. 255 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
187. Id. at 123-24.
188. Id. at 123.
189. 238 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
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grant.190 Also of interest in this case, the court found that an easement in
gross, typically considered personal to the grantee only, can be made as-
signable through express assignment provisions.1 91
In a similar vein, in Brownlow v. State of Texas, the court limited an
easement obtained by inverse condemnation.1 92 The court found that an
easement for a detention facility did not include extraction and use of the
soil.193 When an easement is given, in this case obtained by condemna-
tion, nothing passes by implication.194 It was unnecessary for the grantor
to make any reservation in the grant to protect his interests.
D. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS,
AND OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS
In connection with restrictive covenants, condominiums, and owners'
associations, there were only a few cases providing substantive guidance.
In Owens v. Ousey,195 the court held that Declarations of Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs) could not be amended or extended
after they had expired by their terms. This case dealt with a mobile home
which had been prohibited by the restrictions. The court held that a re-
ciprocal negative easement could not be implied when there were express
restrictions, even though those restrictions had expired by their terms. 196
Clearly, the court sent a strong drafting lesson and a directive to property
owners' associations to monitor the restrictions.
The courts also took steps to avoid ruling on CCRs, finding in multiple
cases that the issues were not ripe. In Schroeder v. Rancho Escondido
Community Improvement Ass'n, the court found that contemplated
amendments to the subdivision deed restrictions were not ripe for consid-
eration until the amendment occurred. 197 Similarly, in Noel v. Airpark
Homeowners Ass'n, the court again found a dispute over an air park's
restrictions on homeowner duties was not ripe.1 98 Finally, in Rakowski v.
Committee to Protect Clear Creek Village Homeowners' Rights,199 a dis-
pute over use of a park for commercial purposes was not ripe. The court
did indicate that reference to CCRs through a plat would make existing
CCRs applicable.
In one other restrictive covenant case of note, Smith v. Houston, a
property was deeded, subject to conditions and obligations.2 0 0 The court
found that a grantee under such a deed takes with the limits stated
190. Id. at 546.
191. Id.
192. 251 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. filed).
193. Id. at 762.
194. Id. at 761.
195. 241 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).
196. Id. at 131.
197. 248 S.W.3d 415, 447 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet.).
198. 246 S.W.3d 827, 835 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. filed).
199. 252 S.W.3d 673, 683-84 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
200. 251 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
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therein and was not required to sign the deed.2 01
E. HOMESTEAD
Three cases in the survey period addressed homestead, particularly
home equity lending. In Fix v. Flag Star Bank, FSB, the court noted that
the cure provisions available via the Texas Constitution applied according
to when the home equity loan was created.20 2 In this case, because the
sixty-day specific cure provisions were enacted after the date of the loan,
the previous law requiring a cure within a reasonable time period
applied.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals in Meador v. EMC Mortgage Corp.
also noted, in addressing an alleged violation of the constitutional provi-
sions relating to home equity lending, that a separate unsecured loan was
not additional funds nor part of the 80% debt to fair market value limita-
tion.20 3 Finally, in Smith v. Hennington, the court noted that the rural
character of a property could change over time.2 0 4 In Smith, property
that was originally rural had become urban because of the extension of
the city limits, as voted by the residents, and application of the Property
Code factors in section 41.001.
F. Lis PENDENS
In Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Howard, the Austin Court of Ap-
peals provides an excellent discussion of the purposes of lis pendens and
the limitations of such a notice. 20 5 In this case, the court noted that the lis
pendens only gave notice of the pleadings on file at the time of the trans-
action with respect to the property occurred. 20 6 Moreover, a lis pendens
is only appropriate when the litigation involves a claim to title or an inter-
est in real property, and it is not appropriate when real property is only
collaterally relevant to the issue at hand. 20 7 Because the pleadings sought
to impose a lien arising via a constructive trust based on illegally obtained
monies that had been used to buy the property, this was not sufficient to
support a lis pendens. 20 8 In other words, the claimant did not seek a di-
rect interest in the property or a return of the property but rather only
sought to impose a right to recover the monies used to buy the property.
This decision is a close one with many cases on either side of the question.
When illegally obtained money is used to acquire real property and a
claimant seeks to impose a lien against the property, such a lien would
arguably encumber the real property title. This case probably turned
201. Id. at 823.
202. 242 S.W.3d 147, 157-59 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
203. 236 S.W.3d 451, 452 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, pet. denied).
204. 249 S.W.3d 600, 603-04 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet. denied).
205. 240 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).
206. Id. at 5.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 6.
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more on timing and late pleadings than a question of whether or not it
was a claimed interest in the property.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In the area of deceptive trade practices, the only case dealing with any-
thing of significance during this survey period was Fix v. Flagstar Bank,
FSB.20 9 In this case, the court noted that a loan transaction, even though
it involved real estate as collateral, would not support a deceptive trade
practices claim. 210 The borrowing of money was neither the acquisition
of goods nor services. 211 Thus, an alleged violation of the home equity
lending constitutional requirements would not give rise to a deceptive
trade practices claim.
B. PREMISES LIABILITY
In the area of premises liability, the Texas Supreme Court did extend
the responsibility of a pet owner in Bushnell v. Mott.212 In this case, even
though the pet dog was not known to be vicious, once an attack against a
person began, the owner of that dog had a duty to attempt to stop the
attack. The dog owner demonstrated no knowledge of any viciousness in
the dog, but he failed to do anything to stop the attack after it started.213
This created a question of whether the owner failed to exercise ordinary
care over the dog once the attack began.
209. 242 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied)
210. Id. at 160-61.
211. Id. at 160.
212. 254 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. 2008).
213. Id. at 452.
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